

TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION
REPORT

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APPENDIX 3.8.X.

**GUIDELINES ON SURVEILLANCE
FOR AFRICAN HORSE SICKNESS**

Article 3.8.X.1.

Introduction

This Appendix defines the principles and provides a guide on the surveillance for African horse sickness (AHS), complementary to Appendix 3.8.1., applicable to countries seeking to demonstrate recognition for a declared African horse sickness virus (AHSV) status. This may be for the entire country or *zone*. ~~Guidelines~~ Guidance for countries seeking free status following an outbreak and for the maintenance of AHS status is also provided.

AHS is a vector-borne *infection* transmitted by a limited number of species of *Culicoides* insects. Unlike the related bluetongue virus, AHSV is so far geographically restricted to sub Saharan Africa with periodic excursions into North Africa, southwest Europe, the Middle East and adjacent regions of Asia. An important component of AHSV epidemiology is vectorial capacity which provides a measure of *disease risk* that incorporates vector competence, abundance, seasonal incidence, biting rates, survival rates and the extrinsic incubation period. However, methods and tools for measuring some of these vector factors remain to be developed, particularly in a field context.

~~In addition to the general conditions described in~~ According to Chapter 2.5.14. of the *Terrestrial Code*, a Member ~~declaring~~ demonstrating freedom from AHSV *infection* for the entire country, or a *zone* should provide evidence for the existence of an effective surveillance programme. The strategy and design of the surveillance programme will depend on the prevailing epidemiological circumstances and should be planned and implemented according to general conditions and methods described in this Appendix. This requires the support of a laboratory able to undertake identification of AHSV *infection* through the virus detection and antibody tests described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Susceptible wild equid populations should be included in the surveillance programme ~~when these animals are intended for trade~~.

Case definition

For the purposes of surveillance, a *case* refers to an equid infected with AHSV.

The purpose of surveillance is to determine if a country or *zone* is free from AHSV or if a zone is seasonally free from AHSV. Surveillance deals not only with the occurrence of clinical signs caused by AHSV, but also with evidence of *infection* with AHSV in the absence of clinical signs.

The following defines the occurrence of AHSV *infection*:

1. AHSV has been isolated and identified as such from an equid or a product derived from that equid, or
2. viral antigen or viral RNA specific to one or more of the serotypes of AHSV has been identified in samples from one or more equids showing clinical signs consistent with AHS, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with AHSV, or
3. serological evidence of active *infection* with AHSV by detection of seroconversion with production of antibodies to structural or nonstructural proteins of AHSV that are not a consequence of vaccination have been identified in one or more equids that either show clinical signs consistent with AHS, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected *case*, or give cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with AHSV.

Standards for diagnostic tests and vaccines are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 3.8.X.2.

General conditions and methods

1. A surveillance system should be under the responsibility of the *Veterinary Administration Authority*. In particular the following should be in place:
 - a) a formal and ongoing system for detecting and investigating *outbreaks of disease*;
 - b) a procedure for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspect cases of AHS to a laboratory for AHS diagnosis as described in the *Terrestrial Manual*;
 - c) a system for recording, managing and analysing diagnostic, epidemiologic and surveillance data.
2. The AHS surveillance programme should:
 - a) in a country/*zone*, free or seasonally free, include an early warning system for reporting suspicious cases. Persons who have regular contact with equids, as well as diagnosticians, should report promptly any suspicion of AHS to the *Veterinary Authority*. An effective surveillance system will periodically identify suspicious cases that require follow-up and investigation to confirm or exclude that the cause of the condition is AHS. The rate at which such suspicious cases are likely to occur will differ between epidemiological situations and cannot therefore be predicted reliably. All suspected cases of AHS should be investigated immediately and samples should be taken and submitted to an *approved laboratory*. This requires that sampling kits and other equipment are available for those responsible for surveillance;
 - b) conduct random or targeted serological and virological surveillance appropriate to the *infection* status of the country or *zone* in accordance with Appendix 3.8.1.

Article 3.8.X.3.

Surveillance strategies

The target population for surveillance aimed at identification of *disease* and/or *infection* should cover susceptible ~~domestic~~ equids within the country or *zone*. Active and passive surveillance for AHSV *infection* should be ongoing. Surveillance should be composed of random or targeted approaches using virological, serological and clinical methods appropriate for the *infection* status of the country or *zone*.

A country should justify the surveillance strategy chosen as appropriate to detect the presence of AHSV *infection* in accordance with Appendix 3.8.1. and the prevailing epidemiological situation. It may, for example, be appropriate to target clinical surveillance at particular species likely to exhibit clinical signs (e.g. horses). Similarly, virological and serological testing may be targeted to species that rarely show clinical signs (e.g. donkeys).

In vaccinated populations serological and virological surveillance is necessary to detect the AHSV types circulating to ensure that all circulating types are included in the vaccination programme.

If a Member wishes to declare freedom from AHSV *infection* in a specific *zone*, the design of the surveillance strategy would need to be aimed at the population within the *zone*.

For random surveys, the design of the sampling strategy will need to incorporate epidemiologically appropriate design prevalence. The sample size selected for testing will need to be large enough to detect *infection* if it were to occur at a predetermined minimum rate. The sample size, expected prevalence and diagnostic sensitivity of the tests determine the level of confidence in the results of the survey. The ~~applicant~~ country must justify the choice of design prevalence and confidence level based on the objectives of surveillance and the epidemiological situation, in accordance with Appendix 3.8.1. Selection of the design prevalence, in particular, needs to be based on the prevailing or historical epidemiological situation.

Irrespective of the survey approach selected, the sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic tests employed are key factors in the design, sample size determination and interpretation of the results obtained. Ideally, the sensitivity and specificity of the tests used should be validated for the vaccination/*infection* history and the different species in the target population.

Irrespective of the testing system employed, surveillance system design should anticipate the occurrence of false positive reactions. If the characteristics of the testing system are known, the rate at which these false positives are likely to occur can be calculated in advance. There needs to be an effective procedure for following up positives to ultimately determine with a high level of confidence, whether they are indicative of *infection* or not. This should involve both supplementary tests and follow-up investigation to collect diagnostic material from the original sampling unit as well as those which may be epidemiologically linked to it.

The principles for surveillance for *disease/infection* are technically well defined. Surveillance programmes to prove the absence of AHSV *infection/circulation*, need to be carefully designed to avoid producing results that are either insufficiently reliable to be accepted by international trading partners, or excessively costly and logistically complicated. The design of any surveillance programme, therefore, requires inputs from professionals competent and experienced in this field.

1. Clinical surveillance

Clinical surveillance aims at the detection of clinical signs of AHS in equids particularly during

a newly introduced *infection*. In horses, clinical signs may include pyrexia, oedema, hyperaemia of mucosal membranes and dyspnoea.

AHS suspects detected by clinical surveillance should always be confirmed by laboratory testing.

2. Serological surveillance

Serological surveillance of equid populations is useful to confirm absence of AHSV transmission in a country or *zone*. The species tested should reflect the local epidemiology of AHSV *infection*, and the equine species available. Management variables that may reduce the likelihood of *infection*, such as the use of insecticides and animal housing, should be taken into account when selecting equids to be included in the surveillance system.

Samples should be examined for antibodies against AHSV using tests prescribed in the *Terrestrial Manual*. Positive AHSV antibody tests results can have four possible causes:

- a) natural *infection* with AHSV;
- b) vaccination against AHSV;

maternal antibodies;

- c) positive results due to the lack of specificity of the test.

It may be possible to use sera collected for other purposes for AHSV surveillance. However, the principles of survey design described in these guidelines and the requirements for a statistically valid survey for the presence of AHSV *infection* should not be compromised.

The results of random or targeted serological surveys are important in providing reliable evidence that no AHSV *infection* is present in a country or *zone*. It is, therefore, essential that the survey is thoroughly documented. It is critical to interpret the results in light of the movement history of the animals being sampled.

Serological surveillance in a *free zone* should target those areas that are at highest risk of AHSV transmission, based on the results of previous surveillance and other information. This will usually be towards the boundaries of the *free zone*. In view of the epidemiology of AHSV, either random or targeted sampling is suitable to select herds and/or animals for testing.

Serological surveillance in a free country or *zone* should be carried out over an appropriate distance from the border with an infected country or *infected zone*, based upon geography, climate, history of *infection* and other relevant factors. The surveillance should be carried out over a distance of at least 100 kilometres from the border with that country or *zone*, but a lesser distance could be acceptable if there are relevant ecological or geographical features likely to interrupt the transmission of AHSV. An AHSV free country or *zone* may be protected from an

adjacent infected country or *infected zone* by a *buffer zone*.

Serological surveillance in *infected zones* will identify changes in the boundary of the *zone*, and can also be used to identify the AHSV types circulating. In view of the epidemiology of AHSV *infection*, either random or targeted sampling is suitable.

3. Virological surveillance

Isolation and genetic analysis of AHSV from a proportion of infected animals is beneficial in terms of providing information on serotype and genetic characteristics of the viruses concerned.

Virological surveillance using tests described in the *Terrestrial Manual* can be conducted:

- a) to identify virus circulation in at risk populations;
- b) to confirm clinically suspect cases;
- c) to follow up positive serological results;
- d) to better characterize the genotype of circulating virus in a country or *zone*.

4. Sentinel animals

Sentinel animals are a form of targeted surveillance with a prospective study design. They comprise groups of unexposed equids managed at fixed locations and sampled regularly to detect new AHSV *infections*.

The primary purpose of a sentinel equid programme is to detect AHSV *infections* occurring at a particular place, for instance sentinel groups may be located on the boundaries of *infected zones* to detect changes in distribution of AHSV. In addition, sentinel equid programmes allow the timing and dynamics of *infections* to be observed.

A sentinel equid programme should use animals of known source and history of exposure, control management variables such as use of insecticides and animal housing (depending on the epidemiology of AHSV in the area under consideration), and be flexible in its design in terms of sampling frequency and choice of tests.

Care is necessary in choosing the sites for the sentinel groups. The aim is to maximise the chance of detecting AHSV activity at the geographical location for which the sentinel site acts as a sampling point. The effect of secondary factors that may influence events at each location, such as climate, may also be analysed. To avoid confounding factors sentinel groups should comprise animals selected to be of similar age and susceptibility to AHSV *infection*. The only feature distinguishing groups of sentinels should be their geographical location. Sera from sentinel animal programmes should be stored methodically in a serum bank to allow retrospective studies to be conducted in the event of new serotypes being isolated.

The frequency of sampling should reflect the equid species used and the reason for choosing the sampling site. In endemic areas virus isolation will allow monitoring of the serotypes and genotypes of AHSV circulating during each time period. The borders between infected and non infected areas can be defined by serological detection of *infection*. Monthly sampling intervals are frequently used. Sentinels in declared free zones add to confidence that AHSV *infections* are

not occurring unobserved. Here sampling prior to and after the possible period of transmission is sufficient.

Definitive information on AHSV circulating in a country or *zone* is provided by isolation and identification of the viruses. If virus isolation is required sentinels should be sampled at sufficiently frequent intervals to ensure that some samples are collected during the period of viraemia.

5. Vector surveillance

AHSV is transmitted between equine hosts by species of *Culicoides* which vary across the world. It is therefore important to be able to identify potential vector species accurately although many such species are closely related and difficult to differentiate with certainty.

The main purpose of vector surveillance is to define high, medium and low-risk areas and local details of seasonality by determining the various species present in an area, their respective seasonal occurrence, and abundance. Vector surveillance has particular relevance to potential areas of spread. Long term surveillance can also be used to assess vector abatement measures.

The most effective way of gathering this information should take account of the biology and behavioural characteristics of the local vector species of *Culicoides* and may include the use of Onderstepoort-type light traps or similar, operated from dusk to dawn in locations adjacent to equids.

Vector surveillance should be based on scientific sampling techniques. The choice of the number and types of traps to be used in vector surveillance and the frequency of their use should take into account the size and ecological characteristics of the area to be surveyed.

The operation of vector surveillance sites at the same locations as sentinel animals is advisable.

The use of a vector surveillance system to detect the presence of circulating virus is not recommended as a routine procedure as the typically low vector *infection* rates mean that such detections can be rare. Other surveillance strategies are preferred to detect virus circulation.